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1. Introduction 
Reorienting economics (henceforth, RE) analyses many important and extensively 
debated issues in the social sciences. It offers interesting insights on a wide range 
of topics, from social ontology – often neglected by social scientists – to the 
current status of economics. Whatever one thinks of the answers provided in RE, 
Tony Lawson asks some of the searching questions in the social sciences.  
The starting point of RE is the unhealthy condition of modern economics, as 
acknowledged even by prominent mainstream economists. As Lawson forcefully 
shows, orthodox economics has failed according to its own standards. It has 
become a game of model-building played for its own sake, with little explanatory 
or predictive relevance. The central thesis of part I is that this failure is essentially 
due to the application of mathematical-deductivist methods in conditions for 
which they are not appropriate. Mainstream economics is defined, according to 
Lawson, by its insistence on the use of mathematics. However, our best 
understanding of social ontology suggests that social reality is open, internally 
related, organic, structured, and intrinsically dynamic. This implies that the strict 
regularities necessary meaningfully to apply mathematical-deductivist methods 
(the type of regularities observed in experimental settings) almost never occur in 
the social world. Therefore far from being a guarantor of scientific practice, the 
adoption of formal models yields few explanatory insights, and is generally 
inappropriate. An ontological turn, concludes Lawson, is necessary in economics 
to acknowledge the fundamental limitations of the tools used by the vast majority 
of economists. 
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In part II, Lawson argues that even if mathematical-deductivist methods have 
significant limitations, social science is possible, and it should aim to explain 
causal mechanisms. Social reality is structured, and therefore “To pursue causal 
explanation as interpreted here, we require a mode of inference that takes us 
behind the surface phenomenon to its causes, or more generally from phenomena 
lying at one level to causes often lying at a different deeper one. This is 
retroduction” (RE, p.80). Whereas deductive reasoning is forward-looking – and 
oriented towards prediction – the essence of retroduction is backward-looking and 
it aims at explaining some unexpected event a posteriori. The explanatory 
endeavour is started “by feelings of surprise, doubt, concern, or interest, that 
accompany some contrastive observations” (RE, p.93): social science starts after 
something unexpected (in some relevant sense) occurs. The causal forces at play 
in the social realm can be discovered by using contrast explanations, whereby 
“the question posed is not of the form ‘why x?’, but of the form ‘why x rather than 
y?’” (RE, p.86). According to Lawson, scientific knowledge in the form of the 
discovery of causal structures is possible because causal forces are reasonably 
stable over time/space, even though they very rarely produce the closed 
regularities necessary to permit the use of mathematics.  
In part III, Lawson analyses various heterodox schools in economics. The 
main claim is that – albeit often implicitly – all heterodox approaches share a 
common understanding of social reality, a common social ontology, which is 
broadly consonant with that set out in part I of RE. Consistent with this view, 
heterodox approaches are defined by their rejection of the mainstream insistence 
on mathematical-deductivist methods. The book concludes with a detailed 
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historical analysis of the forces that have led to the dominance of the 
mathematical-deductivist approach in economics. 
While the scope and relevance of the issues analysed in RE is thus very broad, 
this paper will concentrate on one key methodological issue, which is central in 
current debates, namely the role of formal models in the social sciences. At the 
heart of Lawson’s theory lies a fundamental methodological concern: given the 
nature of social reality, the adoption of formal models represents a severe 
shortcoming of modern economics. According to Lawson (2009b), for example, 
the inability of economists to analyse, let alone foresee the financial crisis, derives 
to a large extent from their emphasis on formalism. After its mathematical turn, 
economics has forgotten its nature as a social theory, and has lost sight of social 
reality. Reorienting economics thus entails an explicit ontological perspective in 
the discipline, which in turn implies a fundamental change in its methodology. 
2. The strong methodological thesis 
An important preliminary point is that there is some ambiguity about the scope 
of Lawson’s claims on mathematics. In fact, he repeatedly states that he does not 
provide an impossibility claim on the use of mathematics as such, and he does not 
suggest that formal methods should be banished from the social scientist’s toolbox 
(see also Lawson, 2004; 2009a). Further, many of Lawson’s claims are carefully 
qualified so that, for instance, “reliance on methods of mathematical deductive 
modelling more or less necessitates … a focus on conceptions of atomistic 
individuals and closure” (Lawson, 2004, p.334, italics added); or critique focuses 
on “certain sorts of mathematical methods” (ibid., p.337, italics added) and of 
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“methods of mathematical-deductivist modelling as employed in modern 
economics” (RE, p.13, italics added). Based on these qualified claims, one can 
interpret Lawson’s analysis as supporting a weak methodological thesis which 
provides a healthy warning against the excessive formalism characteristic of the 
work of many social scientists, and in particular of economists.  
But as various commentators have noted, despite all caveats, Lawson’s 
arguments lead precisely to the conclusion that formal tools are (almost) always 
inappropriate. Mathematical-deductivist methods presume “constant conjunctions 
of events or states of affairs”, such that “whenever event x, then event y” 
(Lawson, 1997, pp.16-17; RE, pp.105ff). The latter characterise closed systems 
which display the strong regularities typical of the experimental sciences, in 
which the phenomenon is analysed in a system ‘closed’ – or isolated – from 
external influences. But this type of closure, argues Lawson, (almost) never 
occurs in the social realm, which is “open, structured, intrinsically dynamic in a 
manner dependent on social transformation, and highly internally related through 
social relations” (Lawson, 2006, p.500). It immediately follows that “If formal 
models require strict local closure, then formal models are never appropriate” 
(Hodgson, 2004, p.4).1 
Lawson (2009a) rejects the accusation that his stance on mathematics is 
dogmatic by arguing that his analysis spells out the conditions for the successful 
application of formal methods, and he is not ruling out such methods “as an a 
priori disposition” (Lawson, 2009a, p.198). Granting the absence of a dogmatic a 
priori disposition, his analysis of the nature of social reality nevertheless does 
lead to the conclusion that mathematical models are (almost) never likely to 
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succeed in explaining social phenomena. In Lawson’s writings, it is difficult to 
find more than a handful of examples of the successful use of formal models (e.g., 
RE, pp.20-21). Moreover, despite all qualifications, Lawson’s arguments are not 
restricted in application to certain types of models, or to mathematical methods as 
used in mainstream economics. Indeed, it is rather unclear from his analysis what 
alternative models might be useful.2 
It is therefore appropriate to focus on Lawson’s more controversial strong 
methodological thesis (henceforth, SMT) according to which, given the nature of 
social reality, formal approaches are (almost) never useful in the social sciences. 
Two types of criticism can be made against the latter argument. First, one may 
reject Lawson’s description of social reality and, based on an alternative ontology, 
add an argument to conclude that formal models may well be useful/appropriate. 
Given the methodological focus of this paper, however, a different approach is 
adopted: even if one finds Lawson’s broad description of social reality persuasive, 
the SMT does not hold. An ontological claim that reality is – at the most general 
level – open, structured, internally related, etc. has little bearing on methodology. 
As Dow forcefully puts it, “Any further discussion requires that we depart from 
this transcendental notion of openness. As soon as we start conceptualizing the 
economic system, we inevitably invoke closures (normally of a provisional, 
incomplete, sort). Epistemology cannot be conceived of as an open system in the 
same pure sense as social ontology” (Dow, 2004, p.309). 
In the next section, several doubts are raised on the negative part of Lawson’s 
argument, according to which mathematical techniques are (almost always) 
useless in economics. In the following sections, the positive part of Lawson’s 
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analysis is considered and it is argued that his account of contrast explanations, 
and of knowledge creation, does not provide an alternative model of scientific 
theorising that is inherently inconsistent with formal tools. 
3. The pars destruens 
Even granting Lawson’s broad description of social reality, the SMT is not 
compelling because it depends both on an overly restrictive notion of ‘closure’ 
and on a narrow (implicit) definition of mathematical methods and of economics. 
First of all, assume, for the sake of the argument, that Lawson’s definition of 
economics and of formal methods (as essentially oriented towards prediction) is 
satisfactory. Although the social realm may be in general open, structured, etc., it 
is unclear that every social phenomenon possesses these features, and that it 
possesses them to such a degree as to make formal models inadequate. Lawson 
concedes that models can be used, for example, “where a relationship (of causal 
sequence) holds between measurable economic variables, and does so with 
sufficient strictness as to facilitate the successful application of standard 
techniques of econometrics, albeit only within a limited span of time and place” 
(RE, p.105, italics added). So, a reasoning of the type ‘whenever x then y’ can be 
applied, albeit in a specific context. But this weakens the claim that the conditions 
for application of formal models (almost) never occur. For it both explicitly 
admits that local closures may occur, and forcefully suggests that the notion of 
closure itself, and thus the appropriateness of formal methods, may be interpreted 
as a matter of degree (see the notion of “sufficient strictness”), thus further 
expanding, in principle, the scope for the application of mathematical techniques. 
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Lawson rejects the latter conclusion by adopting an extremely strong 
definition of closed systems (RE, pp.105ff) which allows him to conclude that 
local closures (when they occur) are likely to be transient, and that (almost) all 
social systems are open. According to Lawson, a system is open (and therefore 
deductivist methods cannot be used) if it “includes at least one occasion when the 
antecedent event occurs but is not followed by the usual consequent” (RE, p.106). 
Even if the statement ‘whenever x, then y’ (formally, y = f(x)) expresses a relation 
between a single cause x and its effect y, this notion of openness sets an 
impossible epistemological hurdle: the existence of an outlier (or a discordant 
element in a retroductive explanation à la Lawson) does not seem sufficient to 
reject a causal hypothesis.3 Outliers are outliers. That “most observed regularities 
are not uniform or without exception even within limited stretches of space-time” 
(RE, p.106) is obviously true, but nobody would sensibly discard a model or a 
theory based on any one observation at odds with the claims of the theory 
(deductivist or otherwise). 
This is even more evident if the statement y = f(x) expresses a potentially large 
set of causal influences (a vector of causes x), and the analysis is developed under 
a ceteris paribus clause. Again, the logical relation is not falsified or rendered 
irrelevant simply by one observation out of line with the assertions of the theory, 
given that the antecedent is appropriately qualified. Even if Lawson’s statement is 
meant to apply to major breaks beyond outliers, it is unclear that one structural 
break per se makes formal methods irrelevant or misleading. 
In other words, the ontological thesis that all social systems are open requires 
an exceedingly weak notion of openness. But it is unclear that this notion can 
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support the claim that the nature of social reality makes mathematical methods 
inadequate. For this latter, a stronger notion of openness is necessary, and on this 
basis one can then investigate whether at least some social phenomena exhibit 
openness to such an extent and degree that formal models are inappropriate. 
A second problem of Lawson’s analysis relates to his (largely implicit) 
definitions of economics and of mathematical methods. In fact, although 
Lawson’s claims concern the nature of (the whole of) economics as a social 
science and the usefulness of (all types of) formal theorising, virtually all of the 
examples – and certainly the most compelling ones – of the failure of economic 
theorising concern econometrics. The latter choice lends Lawson’s argument a 
great deal of its persuasiveness, but at the same time it is unclear that his negative 
conclusions can be extended to other areas of economics and beyond econometric 
models. Most of the arguments on the limits of mathematics in economics as a 
whole are essentially a fortiori. 
As Hodgson (2004, p.5) has noted, by focusing on econometrics Lawson 
“gives insufficient attention to other applications of mathematical techniques, 
which serve primary purposes other than the prediction or explanation of 
measurable variables”. Hodgson suggests that formal models are useful as a 
heuristic, “to identify possible causal mechanisms that form part of a more 
complex and inevitably open system” (ibid.). He analyses Schelling’s (1969) 
celebrated ethnic segregation model as an example of a successful heuristic, 
which shows that segregation does not necessarily result from racist preferences. 
Lawson’s arguments in RE do not speak to this issue. In his reply to Hodgson, 
however, Lawson (2009a, p.218) denies that models can serve as heuristics 
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because “the heuristic assumptions can go to work in economic methodology only 
after causal mechanisms of interest have already been identified, or at least 
hypothesised”. In particular, he denies that Schelling’s model uncovered any 
relevant mechanism: “I doubt this [mechanism] was ever news. Indeed, do we not 
all experience situations in which a tendency of this sort is so dominant that it is 
even actualised? ... My earliest memories include glimpses of physical education 
lessons in primary school where the teacher regularly asked the class of about 30 
children to form four or so groups. Invariably, as I recall, the groups were wholly 
male or wholly female but not mixed” (ibid., p.216). This reply trivialises 
Schelling’s contribution and it misses its main point. For the model’s contribution 
is not to show that segregation occurs, nor that it occurs when people do not like 
to be located in an ethnically mixed area. The model’s contribution is to show that 
even if people’s preferences are favourable to integration, the response dynamics 
of the game generate segregation. This is hardly a trivial observation, contrary to 
what Lawson’s school example suggests, and Schelling’s model does clarify a 
possible causal mechanism leading to segregation. Indeed, it allows the 
formulation of a causal assumption, to be tested empirically, about the 
determinants of segregation. 
There are many other examples in mainstream economics in which formal 
deductive reasoning has produced results that were not obvious. Here are ten. 
1. Under certain conditions, universally ‘selfish’ behaviour can be Pareto-
efficient, and any efficient situation can be supported by a price mechanism. 
2. That excess demand (supply) generates price rises (falls) is insufficient to 
show the stability of a market mechanism. 
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3. The conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium are extremely strong. In 
general therefore, equilibrium cannot be used for predictive purposes and 
comparative statics analysis cannot be performed.  
4. If the conditions for Pareto efficiency are not met in more than one area, a 
Pareto improvement in one area might make the situation worse. 
5. Public goods cannot be allocated by a decentralised price mechanism. 
6. Aggregation is deeply problematic, whether of ‘capital’ or of individual 
excess demand functions. 
7. Outside of economies producing and exchanging one good, there is no one-
to-one correspondence between wage or profit rates and techniques of production, 
and consequently a theory of distribution relying on a monotonic relationship 
between marginal products and factor prices is in general invalid. 
8. Under intuitively appealing conditions it is in general impossible to produce 
a social ranking over alternative states from individual ones.  
9. Liberalism and democracy (in the sense of the principle of unanimity 
embodied in the notion of Pareto efficiency) are incompatible. 
10. Asymmetric information between agents may destroy markets. 
None of these results seems to fit Lawson’s (implicit) definition of modern 
economics, since they are by no means oriented towards prediction. Yet they are 
core results of mainstream economics and provide good examples of the 
successful use of mathematical models as heuristics, clarifying theoretical 
concepts. As in the case of Schelling’s model, these results, and the mechanisms 
generating them, are far from trivial and they have been established by formal 
reasoning. As Amartya Sen has noted in his Nobel Memorial Lecture, about 
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Arrow’s impossibility theorem (result 8 above): it “can hardly be anticipated on 
the basis of common sense or informal reasoning … Informal insights, important 
as they are, cannot replace the formal investigations that are needed to examine 
the congruity and cogency of combination of values and of apparently plausible 
demands” (Sen, 1999, p.353). 
Deductive formalism has also been useful in areas not conventionally defined 
as mainstream. Considerable effort has been devoted to the exploration of linear 
models in a number of directions. Examples include von Neumann’s work on 
general equilibrium and multi-sectoral growth models; Leontief’s work 
culminating in the input-output methods that underpin national income 
accounting; Seton’s clarification of the Marxian transformation problem; Sraffa’s 
analysis of prices of production; Okishio’s work on the rate of profit; Morishima’s 
formalisation of much of the corpus of Marxian economic theory; and Steedman’s 
application of a Sraffian methodology to Marxian economics. This body of work 
exploring linear economics – some of it constructive and some of it destructive – 
has clarified what can and cannot be said on the basis of certain assumptions. 
These theorisations have greatly helped in clarifying a number of key conceptual 
issues in heterodox and Marxian economics, in ways that would not have been 
accessible with informal reasoning. As Roemer (1981, p.3) has noted, “A model is 
necessarily one schematic image of a theory, and one must not be so myopic as to 
believe other schematic images cannot exist. Nevertheless … the production of 
different and contradicting models of the same theory can be the very process that 
directs our focus to the gray areas of the theory.” 
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In sum, Lawson’s analysis has little or no bearing on a number of key areas of 
economics as a social science, where the application of formal methods is not only 
natural but necessary to derive insights. Further examples can be easily be 
provided. The definitions and analyses of inequalities, exploitation, and classes, 
for instance, require the construction of appropriate indices to measure such 
phenomena, and to analyse their pattern over time and across countries. Moreover 
axiomatic analysis is necessary to state the positive and normative features of the 
relevant measures, and the differences between them. Again, this type of formal 
analysis is by no means oriented towards prediction; yet it is hard to deny that it 
contributes to our understanding of social reality. Adopting less narrow 
definitions of formal methods and of economics as a social science than those 
implicit in Lawson makes it quite unclear that mathematical techniques are 
(almost always) useless. The next sections show that, if anything, Lawson’s 
theory of social scientific explanations provides further evidence of the usefulness 
of formal methods in the social sciences. 
4. The pars construens: contrast explanations  
Does Lawson’s account of contrast explanations provide an alternative model of 
scientific theorising that is inherently inconsistent with formal tools? The problem 
is that Lawson’s model of knowledge creation is open-ended, if not 
underdetermined (so much so that the actual explanatory power of Lawson’s 
contrast questions is unclear, as argued below), and this leaves significant scope 
for the use of formal models. Not only are contrast explanations compatible with 
the use of mathematics; it can also be shown that Lawson’s own model of 
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knowledge creation, whereby “Knowledge … is … a produced means of 
production of further knowledge” (RE, p.92), can be formalised. The former issue 
is analysed in this section, and the latter is considered in Section 5. 
A first important point to note is that the structure of contrast explanations per 
se has no implication about the usefulness of mathematics. There is no reason why 
contrastive questions (‘why x rather than y?’) cannot be tackled with formal tools. 
For example, a neoclassical economist may ask why workers in a company town 
are not paid their marginal product and answer with a theory of monopsony. 
Consider Lawson’s own plant breeding example and the type of controlled 
experiments which involve ‘contrast spaces’ such that in some plots of land a 
chemical compound is used and in others it is not (RE, p.88ff). Clearly it is not the 
structure of the experiment that makes mathematical-deductive reasoning 
inappropriate. According to Lawson, in this case “the focus is not on a specific 
outcome per se, i.e. the level of yield of the crop, but on a comparison or contrast: 
whether or not the yield is significantly higher where the compound has been 
added” (RE, p.88). But here, in principle, formal modelling may usefully enter in 
at least two ways: (i) for the experiment to have some scientific value (rather than 
being a product of mere chance), there must be some a priori hypothesis 
concerning the causal relation between the chemical compound and average crop 
yields, and the latter can naturally be expressed in functional, and so in this sense, 
formal terms. And (ii) even if only contrast, and thus difference matters, the latter 
can certainly be expressed formally (ceteris paribus, whenever the compound is 
used, then average crop yield increases). 
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Indeed, even though, as already noted, Lawson provides no example of fruitful 
mathematical techniques, he explicitly notes that mathematics is not limited to 
deductivist modelling, and “if it is ever appropriate to ‘associate’ a method with 
an ontology I see no reason to suggest that some mathematical methods could not 
be associated with a causalist ontology” (Lawson, 2004, p.338). This would 
suggest that the causal explanations sought by Lawson can in principle be 
expressed formally. Even more forcefully, prominent critical realist Erik Wright 
argues that “lurking behind every informal causal explanation is a tacit formal 
model. All explanatory theories contain assumptions, claims about the conditions 
under which the explanations hold” (Wright, 1989, p.45). From this perspective, 
proper formal modelling is appropriate to analyse causal relations of the type 
outlined by Lawson, because it makes the relevant theoretical assumptions 
explicit and open to critical scrutiny.  
Further, there are some features of contrast explanations that provide room for 
the use of formal methods in social scientific investigations. Suppose that the 
difference between the two types of questions (‘why x?’ or ‘why x rather than y?’) 
is indeed strict. Then many important issues remain outside the scope of scientific 
inquiry, such as all questions concerning the existence or the definition of certain 
phenomena. Consider the Marxian notion of exploitation: the question ‘Why is 
there exploitation in capitalist economies?’ cannot even be formulated. In fact, 
according to Marx, although exploitation is definitionally a feature of any class 
society, the only thing that can be observed by comparing capitalism and 
feudalism is that the form of appearance of that exploitation is different. How can 
the social scientist move from this observation to a notion of exploitation itself? 
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Lawson acknowledges the explanatory limitations of a strict interpretation of 
the contrast and therefore allows for the possibility that y = not x (RE, p.104), so 
that the relevant question becomes ‘why x rather than not x?’ A first implication 
of this move is that in many instances the contrastive scenario y = not x, inevitably 
entails counterfactual analyses. For example, in order to conceptualise 
exploitation a counterfactual comparison is needed of the form: ‘what is a society 
without exploitation?’ But if counterfactual comparisons fall within the scope of 
contrast explanations, then ‘fictional theorising’ of the sort rejected by Lawson 
(being associated with deductivist reasoning) becomes central to his 
epistemology. Perhaps more importantly, Lawson acknowledges that “at first 
sight this might seem to render all outcomes open to contrast explanation, and 
thereby perhaps to trivialise the explanatory approach being elaborated. But this is 
not so. For an essential condition of contrast explanation is surprise, interest, 
doubt, etc.” (RE, p.104). This strategy has some undesirable implications for 
Lawson’s theory, concerning both the epistemological status of contrast 
explanations in general, and the role of formal models in contrast explanations. 
First, it is unclear that the latter strategy does not trivialise the approach, 
because the necessary conditions for contrast explanation (surprise, etc.) are 
entirely subjective and a priori undetermined: anything can be a source of surprise 
and therefore, contra Lawson, all outcomes are potentially open to contrast 
explanations. Besides, according to Lawson, the state of things cannot be known: 
we cannot explain the level of crop yield (RE, p.88), or the behaviour, or state, of 
cows (RE, p.95). Since the basic form of knowledge creation is contrast 
explanation, argues Lawson, we can only explain variations, or differences. But 
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then, if the state of things cannot be explained, it is unclear how the original 
expectations about events can be rationally formed: where does the contrasting 
hypothesis come from? There is no guarantee that the original expectation, say y, 
is rationally formed, let alone the product of some sort of causal reasoning. 
Indeed, the epistemological approach developed by Lawson provides no well-
defined restrictions so that any initial assumption is in principle legitimate, 
including customary beliefs, religious creeds, superstitions, etc. But then, why 
should the feeling of ‘surprise’ (arising out of observing x rather than y) lead us to 
search for causal phenomena? To state that surprise “[presupposes] a concerned 
and knowledgeable orientation” (RE, p.94) is unwarranted, because nothing in the 
element of surprise definitionally requires such orientation. And to define surprise 
as requiring such orientation is equivalent to assuming what needs to be proved.4 
The second, somewhat ironic, implication of this specific subjectivist aspect of 
Lawson’s epistemology is that, by leaving the entry point of the explanatory 
process (i.e. the initial assumption concerning the relevant phenomenon) 
undetermined, it provides a natural place for mathematical models: they may play 
an important heuristic role in the construction of the initial assumptions of the 
theoretical explanation. After all, the essence of the method is that knowledge 
advances “by getting things knowledgeably wrong” (RE, p.101), and Lawson is 
emphatic that mathematical methods should not be banned a priori.  
True, according to Lawson, in most occasions, formal models will prove 
wrong, since strict closures do not obtain. But this can only be known a posteriori 
and therefore nothing prevents social scientists from formulating their initial 
assumptions in a formal guise. Indeed, in Lawson’s epistemology, the very fact 
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that a formal model is falsified might tell us something relevant concerning the 
nature of a social phenomenon, in addition to the causal forces at hand. Using a 
formal model to build an initial assumption which may be falsified may therefore 
prove doubly informative. The trouble with this is that if formal models are 
allowed as heuristics in the formulation of initial assumptions (and nothing in 
Lawson’s theory rules this out), then it is unclear that an element of surprise or 
contrast generated by some unexpected outcome would necessarily lead to their 
abandonment ex post. Once an unexpected event occurs, it is unclear how one can 
distinguish between the failure of an otherwise appropriate formal model to take 
account of all relevant causal forces, and the inappropriateness of a formal 
approach per se. 
In sum, contrast explanations seem neither necessary nor sufficient to create 
knowledge (as maintained, instead, in RE, pp.92-93). But in any case, nothing in 
the structure of contrast explanations implies that formal models are inappropriate 
in social scientific inquiry, and indeed the open-ended nature of Lawson’s theory 
itself suggests useful applications of mathematical-deductivist reasoning. 
5. The pars construens: a deductivist model of knowledge creation 
Setting aside the doubts on contrast explanations raised in section 4, a striking 
example of deductivist reasoning is given by Lawson’s own model of knowledge 
creation, which can be described as follows: “we start out, at any point in time, 
with a stock of knowledge, hunches, data, anomalies, suspicions, guesses, 
interests, etc.” (RE, p.92). Based on this stock of knowledge, we form some 
‘reasonable expectations’ on events, or outcomes. When expectations are violated, 
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we start a process of revision of our knowledge by means of contrast explanations, 
which leads to uncover some previously unexpected causal mechanism. 
“Knowledge, then, is found to be a produced means of production of further 
knowledge” (RE, p.92). 
This account can be naturally translated into the deductive statement: 
‘Whenever event x (x = a knowledgeable mistake), then event y (y = knowledge 
increases)’. Hence, quite interestingly, Lawson’s approach provides a natural 
framework for a formalisation of the process of accumulation of knowledge. Let 
Kt denote the stock of knowledge at time t. Let Eot denote the expected outcome 
(of a certain causal process) at time t on the basis of knowledge Kt, so that we can 
write Eot = f(Kt), where f indicates the relevant process of formulation of 
hypothesis. (Note that Eot could denote a vector of expected outcomes.)  
If ot denotes the actual outcome, then the process of creation of knowledge 
according to Lawson can be modelled as Kt+1 - Kt = g(Eot - ot): the variation in the 
stock of knowledge depends on the discrepancy between expectations and 
realisations. The key assumptions of Lawson’s approach can be stated as g(0) = 0, 
(there can be no knowledge creation without some pre-existing knowledge), and 
g(Eot - ot) ≥ 0 whenever Eot ≠ ot, (knowledge is created whenever expectations are 
shown to be wrong). Substituting for Eot, one obtains Kt+1 - Kt = g(f(Kt) - ot): this 
can be called ‘Lawson’s law of knowledge accumulation’ and it formalises the 
creation of knowledge by means of knowledge and ‘surprise’. 
If contrast explanations are considered to be sufficient for the creation of 
knowledge, then the previous model can be seen as a possible alternative to 
mainstream models of knowledge and human capital accumulation.5 And one may 
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argue that the adoption of a formal model helps to clarify the critical features of 
Lawson’s model of knowledge creation. For example, lacking a clear analysis of 
Kt, the model does not provide an understanding of the creation of scientific 
knowledge but only a law of motion of acquired beliefs, rational or irrational. 
Further, since f is a priori undetermined, any form of creation of expectations 
leads to a change in the stock of knowledge. Lawson also seems to suggest that g 
is strictly monotone in Eot - ot: the more significant the mistake in expectations, 
the higher the creation of knowledge. 
Be that as it may, if one accepts Lawson’s epistemological approach, then his 
model of knowledge accumulation can be formalised, and a number of properties 
of the theory can be investigated by analysing the properties of the postulated 
functional relations. And this conclusion is independent of any assumptions on 
measurability: the fact that some of the variables in the equation of notion of the 
stock of knowledge are difficult, or even impossible to measure, does not make 
Lawson’s analysis any less ‘deductivist’, nor does it make formal methods 
inadequate (see, for example, Katzner, 2009). 
6. Reorienting economics? 
The previous analysis raises serious doubts on the SMT: even granting 
Lawson’s broad account of social ontology, formal models can play an important 
role in economics, and in the social sciences, as heuristics and in the analysis of 
theoretical constructions. The SMT provides doubtful foundations for a strategy 
aimed at reorienting economics. Can the weak methodological thesis (henceforth, 
WMT) provide more satisfactory foundations for reorienting economics? 
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As noted above, the WMT is more persuasive, and a critical reconsideration of 
the use of formal models in economics is long overdue. It is unclear, however, 
that the WMT can provide clear and persuasive guidance for reorienting 
economics. An analysis pitched only at the most abstract ontological and 
methodological level, focusing generically on mathematics (rather than on 
specific models and theorisations) and explicitly refraining from any 
consideration of substantive concepts and propositions, is unlikely to lead far. 
Consider Lawson’s definition of the orthodox vs. heterodox divide, which is 
(at least in principle) based on the WMT. ‘Orthodoxy’ is characterised by the 
insistence on the use of mathematics, and ‘heterodoxy’ as the negation of the 
claim that “forms of mathematical deductive method should everywhere be 
utilised” (Lawson, 2006, p.492). Reorienting economics can then be interpreted as 
the substitution of a more pluralistic heterodox attitude for the orthodox one. 
It is almost uncontroversial that most economists place an excessive emphasis 
on mathematics; that this methodological bias is not neutral in terms of 
substantive conclusions; and that formal models are not necessarily the most 
fruitful way of understanding every social phenomenon (see Elster, 2009). Yet 
Lawson’s definition does not help to understand the current status of the discipline 
and its internal dynamic, and it is not particularly useful for reorienting it. 
First, taken literally, the criterion for orthodoxy is overly restrictive. Despite 
the (clear) mathematising inclination of most economists, few of them would 
actually insist that the use of mathematics should be ‘universalised’, i.e. it should 
be literally used “always and everywhere” (Lawson, 2006, p.492). 
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Second, the emphasis on ‘the insistence in the use of mathematics’ shifts the 
focus of analysis on to the subjective dispositions and inclinations of economists. 
Thus, the concept of ‘mainstream’ is hardly an analytical category, because 
orthodox becomes synonymous with (methodologically) ‘closed-minded’. 
Further, this approach characterises economists, but not orthodox and heterodox 
economics, nor even economists’ work. Therefore, lacking some evidence of the 
subjective attitude towards mathematics in general (e.g., methodological 
meditations), it is impossible to tell whether an economist (and his/her work) is 
heterodox or orthodox. Thus there is potentially a very large set of economists 
who are impossible (and not just difficult) to ‘classify’ in a non arbitrary way.  
Indeed, it is impossible a priori to tell whether an article, or the entire lifetime 
contribution of an economist, or even a journal is orthodox, by simply analysing 
its content. Even the fact that all of the contributions (by the economist or in the 
journal considered) focus on formal models says nothing about the insistence on 
mathematics, and provides at most prima facie evidence of a methodological 
stance. After all, as Lawson repeatedly notes, not all uses of mathematics are a 
priori illegitimate, so that a methodologically open-minded economist may still be 
using mathematics in a specific setting where formal methods are appropriate. 
In sum, if Lawson’s subjectivist interpretation of the WMT and of the 
orthodox/heterodox divide is taken at face value, then it does not provide robust 
foundations for reorienting economics. Indeed, it is unclear that the replacement 
of the current orthodoxy would lead to any substantive change in the practices of 
economists beyond a generically more pluralistic (subjective) attitude. Economists 
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may become more open-minded, but their work and practices may remain 
substantially unaltered. 
To be sure, one might argue that the orthodox persistent use of formalisations 
represents sufficient evidence of their insistence on the use of mathematics. This 
interpretation makes Lawson’s approach less vague, but it remains unclear that it 
can provide the foundations for reorienting economics. For the purely 
methodological orientation of Lawson’s approach does not allow a proper 
understanding of the current status of economics and the role of mathematics in it. 
Consider the examples of economic theorising analysed in section 3 above. For 
Lawson, all the contributions to the analysis of linear economies, from von 
Neumann to Sraffa and Morishima would be mainstream economics because of 
the methodology employed. Not only is this counterintuitive; it strongly suggests 
that there is something wrong with Lawson’s definition. 
More importantly, it is worth stressing again that all of the results 1-10 above 
have been derived within mainstream economics. What is interesting about 
mainstream economics is not that these results are controversial. They are not. 
They are well-established. It is rather that, as results of mainstream economics, 
they are routinely ignored by mainstream economics. This suggests that Lawson’s 
definition of mainstream economics in terms of its commitment to deductive 
formalism is inadequate because it does not engage with its substantive content. 
Reorienting economics requires an appropriate definition of the mainstream, and 
this in turn requires an analysis of substantive issues. Although space constraints 
preclude a proper treatment of this issue, the next, and concluding, section offers 
some preliminary remarks that represent a first step in this direction. 
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7. What is mainstream economics? 
The 1870s turn in economics is often and with reason termed the ‘marginalist 
revolution’. Marginalism is a feature of optimisation (at least under conditions of 
continuity), and so it is a small step to assert that the defining feature of 
mainstream economics is the realisation of that revolution (via Samuelson’s 1947 
Foundations of Economic Analysis), and this is what Lawson does. The problem 
with this, as we have repeatedly hinted above, is that the focus on method is 
unhelpful because it does not in fact distinguish orthodoxy from heterodoxy. To 
do that requires some focus on content. Nevertheless, the ‘marginalist revolution’ 
is indeed a good starting point, not however because of its marginalism, but 
because of its ‘subjectivism’ (it is also occasionally known as the ‘subjectivist 
revolution’). 
The marginalist revolution focused attention on exchange rather than 
production, and hence concentrated on the market in a self-consciously different 
way from for example Marx. Rather than seeing competition as a war to the death, 
competition became the means of attaining social harmony as individuals 
maximised their utility (constrained by income and given prices). Utility functions 
therefore took centre-stage, and the preferences they expressed were assumed 
exogenous to any explanation of social phenomena. This in turn rendered 
individuals asocial, collapsing the social into a collection of individuals none of 
whom could affect the preferences of any other. 
This remains a defining feature of the mainstream: individual preferences are 
exogenous, and attempts to endogenise preferences are destructive to the whole 
project. Indeed, the exogeneity of preferences in large part defines the ontology of 
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mainstream economics. For the ontology of the mainstream is that it is a 
characteristic of human nature to be acquisitive, but scarcity is pervasive because 
wants are unlimited relative to the resources available to satisfy them; hence 
choices must be made, and economics is the study of these choices and their 
consequences. Typically (although not essentially), these choices involve rational 
agents optimising, and typically (although not essentially) analysis concentrates 
on the compatibility of choices through the study of equilibria. 
But this ontology emerges from a particular contingent characteristic of 
capitalist societies. For the incessant expansion of capital requires its realization in 
money form, which requires continual output growth in the form of commodities 
that can, indeed must, be sold. This in turn requires ever-increasing demand, 
which in turn requires acquisitive consumers. So mainstream ontology 
universalizes a behavioural specificity of contemporary society, and then treats 
the present as a particular realization of that universal. It is not then surprising that 
detailed historical analysis of economic behaviour is rare in the mainstream, for it 
is quite unnecessary. If all empirical instances, no matter how historically 
different, are treated as hypostatizations of the same universal, the social 
disappears. Wage-labour becomes labour; capital becomes the instruments of 
production; the labour process becomes a production function; acquisitive 
behaviour becomes human nature, and so on. On this basis, axioms are postulated 
and theory is developed through a succession of models. But the problem is not 
any insistence on deductive formalism. It is rather a content which hypostasises 
the present as an instance of the universal, and this in turn is a consequence of a 
methodology of individualism with a content of exogenous preferences. Anything 
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that threatens this structure, even if it is a consequence of modelling within this 
structure (such as results 1-10 above), is routinely ignored. 
It is not then surprising that individual endowments are taken as exogenous 
too. For they are obviously historically determined, and when history has been so 
comprehensively excised from the mainstream, there is little that can be said. For 
the same reason, technology is generally taken as exogenous. Sawn-off versions 
of the mainstream commonly use production functions, collections of pre-existing 
blueprints among which profit-maximising firms choose on the basis of given 
prices. Technical change (manna from heaven) then shifts production functions, 
measured as total factor productivity (the ‘dark matter’ of economics). These 
concepts have repeatedly been shown to be deeply problematic, but to no avail. 
More general versions of the mainstream eschew production functions in favour 
of convex production sets, but the generality achieved (and the exclusion of all but 
the most limited increasing returns to scale) has no purchase on applied analysis. 
The mainstream is not then defined by its pervasive use of deductivist 
modelling. It is defined by a methodological individualism in which preferences, 
endowments and technology are treated as exogenous. It is quite true that this is 
associated with a focus on deductivist modelling. But deductivist modelling is a 
consequence of the original stance, which elides the social and the historical 
through its treatment of individuals and their preferences as concrete expressions 
of abstract universals. It is not that the atomism is a functional consequence of an 
insistence on the use of mathematical deductive methods; rather the converse is 
the case. And this requires a notion of history and historical specificity that is 
absent from Lawson’s methodological approach. 
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Heterodoxy then broadly encompasses all of those analyses that see the social 
as more than a collection of abstract individuals with exogenous preferences, and 
that see the present as the outcome of history. It also encompasses those analyses 
that are subversive of the orthodoxy through immanent critique. Whether any, 
some or all of these analyses use formal deductive methods is not germane. 
Rather, the important question is what formal models can be used to analyse 
which social phenomena. 
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1
 A similar conclusion holds if stochastic closures (Lawson, 1997, p.76) are considered, whereby 
the relevant regularity connects a set of random, rather than deterministic, variables.  
2
 This is ambiguity is especially clear in Lawson (2009b), where he first insists that the 
fundamental problem of modern economics is its insistence on mathematical deductivist 
modelling; then, second, asserts that he is not saying that such modelling can never provide 
insight; and then third, states, “mathematical deductive methods are … of little assistance in the 
analysis of most social phenomena” (Lawson, 2009b, p.763). 
3
 See, for example, the analysis of probabilistic causality in Vercelli (1991). 
4
 Actually, the assumption that the state of things is unknown, and the overall description of the 
process of accumulation of knowledge, imply that contrast explanations provide at best necessary 
conditions for scientific explanations: that the starting point is a rational set of beliefs and 
knowledge, and that the outcome of the revision of established beliefs will be a rational causal 
explanation is simply assumed. The process outlined by Lawson describes also a set of customary 
attitudes (e.g. in the management of crops) that is changed for another set of customary attitudes 
that by chance have proved to provide better yields on average. From a strictly logical viewpoint, 
the study of a causal mechanism is redundant in this process. 
5
 Lawson may argue that the law of knowledge accumulation does not reflect the anti-positivistic 
essence of his method, which rejects ‘accounts wherein knowledge is the accumulation of 
incorrigible facts’ (RE, p.101). But the interpretation of the stock of knowledge (and its variation) 
in the model is open, and nothing requires that Kt be given a positivistic interpretation. 
